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Using the large variation in the inflow of immigrants across US states we analyze the impact of immigration
on state employment, average hours worked, physical capital accumulation and, most importantly,
total factor productivity and its skill bias. We use the location of a state relative to the Mexican border
and to the main ports of entry, as well as the existence of communities of immigrants before 1960,
as instruments. We find no evidence that immigrants crowded-out employment and hours worked
by natives. At the same time we find robust evidence that they increased total factor productivity, on
the one hand, while they decreased capital intensity and the skill-bias of production technologies, on
the other. These results are robust to controlling for several other determinants of productivity that
may vary with geography such as R&D spending, computer adoption, international competition in
the form of exports and sector composition. Our results suggest that immigrants promoted efficient
task specialization, thus increasing TFP and, at the same time, promoted the adoption of unskilled-biased
technology as the theory of directed technologial change would predict. Combining these effects, an
increase in employment in a US state of 1% due to immigrants produced an increase in income per
worker of 0.5% in that state.
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gperi@ucdavis.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Immigration during the 1990’s and the 2000’s has signiﬁcantly increased the presence of foreign-born workers
in the U.S. This increase has been very large on average and very unequal across states. In some states, such
as California, one worker in three was foreign-born as of 2006, while in West Virginia only one in one hundred
was. Several studies have analyzed how such diﬀerential inﬂows of immigrants have aﬀected diﬀerent aspects of
state economies such as labor markets (recently Borjas 2006, Card 2001, 2007, 2009, Peri and Sparber 2009),
industrial specialization (Card and Lewis 2007) and innovative capacity (Gauthier-Loiselle and Hunt 2008).
In this paper we take a more systematic approach and use a production-function representation of the
economies of U.S. states to analyze the impact of immigration on the inputs to production (employment,
average hours worked, average skill intensity, and physical capital), on productivity (total factor productivity
and the skill-bias of productivity) and, through these, on income per worker. While a large literature has
analyzed the eﬀects of immigration on employment and hours worked1 (and on wages, using labor market data)
our contribution is to identify the impact of immigration on capital intensity, total factor productivity and
the skill-bias of aggregate productivity using national accounting data combined with census data. As for the
diﬃculty of establishing a causal link between immigration and economic outcomes due to simultaneity and
omitted variable biases, we take a two-pronged approach. First, we identify some state-characteristics likely
to be related to immigration and much less to other determinants of productivity. These are the distance
from the Mexican border and from the two main East-West ports of entry of immigrants (New York and Los
Angeles), as well as the presence of immigrant communities prior to 1960. Interacted with decade dummies, these
geographic variables provide variation that is a strong predictor of the immigrants’ inﬂow, but a priory (as they
are essentially geography-based) not with other productivity shocks. Second, in the instrumented regression of
productivity on immigration rates we introduce proxies for many of the relevant causes of productivity growth in
the last few decades. Treating these as potentially endogenous, and using the same geographical instruments, we
isolate the features of geography that are uncorrelated with those factors while still correlated with immigration
and use them as predictors of immigrant inﬂows. The factors that we explicitly control for are the intensity of
R&D and innovation, the adoption of computers, the openness to international trade as measured by the export
intensity and the sector-composition of the state. Both the positive, signiﬁcant and strong eﬀect of immigration
on total factor productivity and the large, negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of immigration on the skill bias of
productivity survive the inclusion of these controls and the instrumental variable strategy.
We then show that a measure of task-specialization of native workers induced by immigrants explains half
to two thirds of the positive productivity eﬀect, while the eﬀect due to unskilled-biased technological adoption
survives all controls and is compatible with a choice of directed technology at the state level as ﬁrst pointed
1Card (2007) and (2009) discuss the status of this literature.
2out by Lewis (2005) and then by Beaudry, et al. (2008). These results, combined with a constant capital-labor
ratio in production suggest that these productivity gains may arise due to the eﬃcient allocation of skills to
tasks, as immigrants are allocated to manual-intensive jobs, promoting competition and pushing natives to
perform communication-intensive tasks more eﬃciently. Hence eﬃciency gains are likely to come from special-
ization, competition and choice of appropriate techniques in traditional sectors rather than from technological
improvements in high tech sectors.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the production-function approach to accounting
and decomposes the eﬀects of immigration on inputs and productivity. Section 3 describes how each state-level
variable is constructed and presents their behavior over the period 1960-2006. Section 4 shows the OLS and
2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of immigration on inputs, total factor productivity and productivity skill-bias and
performs several robustness checks with respect to the eﬀect of immigration on productivity. Section 5 provides
some concluding remarks.
2 Production Function and Accounting Framework
In order to analyze the impact of immigration on the total and average income of an economy and to decompose
the channel through which immigrants may aﬀect labor productivity, we adopt a production-function approach.
Later we will use the predictions of a simple growth model for the long run balanced growth path of such an
economy. We consider each U.S. state  in year  as producing a homogenous, perfectly tradeable output, using




In expression (1),  indicates total production of the numeraire good;  measures aggregate physical
capital;  measures aggregate hours worked; 
(1−)
 captures total factor productivity; and () is an index











where  =  is the share of total hours worked () supplied by highly educated workers ()
and (1 − )= is the share of total hours worked supplied by less educated workers () 2.T h e
parameter  captures the degree of skill-bias of the productivity used in state  and year .Av a l u ec l o s et o
1 implies that highly educated workers are much more productive than less educated ones, and an increase in
 implies that the highly educated workers are becoming more productive relative to less educated workers.
2The deﬁnitions imply that  +  = 
3Notice that in expression 1, if we carry the terms  and  inside the index () and we call 
 = 
and 
 =( 1− ) we obtain a very common production function3 used in several studies of aggregate
labor markets (Katz and Murphy 1992, Peri and Sparber 2009), of income distribution (Krusell et al. 2000)
and of technological growth (Acemoglu 1998, Caselli and Coleman 2007). In such a production function, more
and less educated workers combine their labor inputs in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function,
where the elasticity of substitution is 0 and 
 and 
 measure the productivity speciﬁct om o r ea n d
less educated workers, respectively. In order to decompose the growth rate of output per worker using the
production function and simple long-run assumptions, it is convenient to re-write (1) in terms of output per








In equation (3)  =  /  captures average hours worked per person and 
 is the capital-output ratio,
which is constant in the balanced growth path of any neoclassical model due to the linearity of the physical
capital accumulation equation in  and  (see for instance page 99 of Barro and Sala i Martin, 2004). We
now take the logarithmic derivative (percentage change) of both sides of equation (3) over time and denote them
with ab(so that for any variable  ln = b ) The percentage change of total output and output per worker
can therefore be expressed as follows:






+ b  + b  + b  (4)
Expression (4) is the basis of our empirical decomposition of the eﬀects of immigration. It says that total
output in a state increases as a consequence of increased employment ( c ) and of increased output per person
(c ). Output per person, in turn, increases due to the contribution of four factors: (i) the capital intensity of
the economy, captured by the capital-output ratio d 
  (ii) the total factor productivity b , (iii) the average
hours worked b  and (iv) the productivity-weighted skill-intensity index measured by b  Such a decomposition
is convenient for several reasons. First, the neoclassical growth model predicts that in the long run (balanced
growth path) output per worker  only grows because of total factor productivity growth ( b   0) while the
other terms (
   and ) are constant. Hence a simple, exogenous increase in employment, as immigration
is sometimes treated as, would only increase d  with no eﬀect in the long run on any other variable nor on .
However, immigration can be much more than a simple inﬂow of people. On the positive side, diﬀerences in
skills, increased competition, changes in the specialization of natives and directed technical change can promote
increases in productivity and capital intensity. On the negative side, crowding of ﬁxed factors and incomplete














4capital adjustment can produce decreases in productivity and capital intensity. Moreover, if the transition
dynamics to the new balanced growth path are slow, capital may take a long time to adjust and the term

 may be below its steady state for a while. With our approach we can analyze the impact of immigration
on each of the ﬁve terms on the right hand side of (4). A second interesting feature of this approach is
that by analyzing the impact on employment (d ) and average hours worked (b ) we can conﬁrm or revise
the existing evidence (from labor market analysis) that immigration did not crowd out natives but instead
increased total employment leaving average hours worked unchanged4.I na n a l y z i n gt h ei m p a c to nb  we can
also verify whether immigration has increased the share of unskilled workers and what average eﬀect this had
on productivity. Finally, we can focus on more novel channels: did immigration aﬀect capital intensity d 
 or
total factor productivity b ? Combining these channels we will be able to understand if immigration leads to
a simple employment increase, possibly biased towards the less educated, or if it has long-run eﬀects on the
structure of the receiving economies. Moreover, since we are also able to identify the separate eﬀects on 
and  we can identify what type of productivity gains (whether skilled or unskilled-biased) or losses have been
produced by immigration.
Our empirical approach entails estimating the impact of immigration on each term on the right hand side of
equation (4). First, using measures of Gross State Product (GSP), capital stocks, hours worked, employment
and relative wages of more and less educated workers, we can calculate each term on the right hand side of
equation (4). Then, if we can identify an inﬂow of immigrants exogenous to the receiving states (driven, that
is, by factors that are not correlated with productivity, employment or physical capital) we can estimate the
elasticities  from the following type of regression:





where  is alternatively the total employment () the capital-output ratio 
 total factor productivity




percentage change in employment due to immigrants (
) and  and  are, respectively, year ﬁxed eﬀects
and zero-mean random shocks.
These regressions produce estimates within a common framework that can then be aggregated to obtain the
eﬀect on total income and on income per worker, thus measuring the aggregate and per capita gains (or losses)
from immigration and the importance of each channel. Clearly, identifying an exogenous inﬂow of immigrants
and ensuring that immigration, and not other unobservable, correlated shocks, is driving the estimated elasticity
is crucial to our goal. For these reasons we will discuss the instrumental variable strategy and the validity of
4We take as reference the labor market estimates of Card (2001), Card (2007) and Card (2009) that do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
negative crowding out eﬀect of immigrats on native employment across US cities.
5the instruments at length and will introduce controls for other long-run technological and specialization trends
in section 4.
Before implementing our empirical analysis, let us specify an important theoretical underpinning of it. If
each state has a production structure as described above and if immigration has some eﬀect on productivity
and/or capital intensity (say positive, as we will ﬁnd below) then diﬀerential immigration can drive diﬀerences
in productivity and wages across states. Because of worker mobility, these diﬀerences will push all workers into
states with higher productivity. To avoid this, we assume that, while in terms of production-prices (in units
of the numeraire) permanent diﬀerences in income per person could arise due to productivity diﬀerences, these
are, however, absorbed by corresponding diﬀerences in the average price index across states, which is driven by
diﬀerences in the prices of housing or ﬁxed amenities. Hence, a diﬀerential increase in income per worker in
state  relative to state  due to immigration (c  − c ) is accompanied by equivalent growth in the price index
of state  and  as the result of changes in housing, land and ﬁxed-amenities prices. Formally this implies that
c  − c  = c  − c  and thus real income diﬀerences are unchanged (c  − c  = c  − c ) for any couple of
states. This is compatible with an equilibrium where workers are mobile. Since we measure output and capital
at common US prices (not adjusted for local cost of living) our analysis allows us to study productivity and
wage diﬀerences across states driven by immigrants. The large literature that documents a strong positive eﬀect
of immigration on housing prices5 conﬁrms that this adjustment mechanism, through land prices and local price
indices, is plausible.
3 Data and Construction of Variables
3.1 Variables Measured Directly
We consider as the units of analysis ﬁfty U.S. states plus Washington D.C. in each census year between 1960
and 2000 and in 2006. We use three main data sources. For data on aggregate employment and hours worked,
including the distinction between more and less educated workers and natives and immigrant workers, we use
the public use micro-data samples (IPUMS) of the U.S. Decennial Census and of the American Community
Survey (Ruggles et al., 2008). For data on GSP we use the series available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2008b). Finally, to calculate state physical capital we use data from the National Economic Accounts,
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2008a). We now describe the construction of each variable in
detail.
To construct employment and hours worked6 we use the general 1% sample for Census 1960, the 1% State
Sample, Form 1, for Census 1970, the 1% State Sample for the Censuses 1980 and 1990, the 1% Census Sample
5For instance Saiz (2003, 2007), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Gonzales and Ortega (2009).
6The details on variable deﬁniiton, construction and data are in the Appendix A.
6for year 2000 and the 1% sample of the American Community Survey (ACS) for the year 2006. Since they
are all weighted samples we use the variable “personal weight” to produce the average and aggregate statistics.
To produce measures of hours worked (or employment) by state and level of education we select the following
sample. First, we include people age 17 and older in the census year (corresponding to 16 and older the previous
year7) not living in group quarters who worked at least one week in the previous year, received positive wage
income and were not self-employed. We then select only workers with work experience of at least one year
a n dl e s st h a no re q u a lt of o r t yy e a r s 8. We divide workers into the two education groups  (those with some
college education or more) and  (those with high school education or less) using the variable EDUCREC
which classiﬁes levels of education consistently across censuses and ACS data. The “foreign-born” status used
to identify native and immigrant workers is given to those workers who are non-citizens or are naturalized
citizens (using the variable “CITIZEN” beginning in 1970 and "BPLD" in 1960).
The hours of labor supplied by each worker are calculated by multiplying hours worked in a week by weeks
worked in a year and individual hours are multiplied by the individual weight (PERWT) and aggregated within
each education-state group. This measure of hours worked by education group and state is the basic measure
of labor supply. We call 
 and 
 the hours worked, respectively, of domestic (native) and foreign highly
educated workers in state  and year  so that  = 
 +
 is the total of hours worked by highly educated
workers in state  and year . Similarly, we call 
 and 
 the hours worked, respectively, by domestic (native)
and foreign less educated workers in state  and year  so that  = 
+
 is the total of hours worked by less
educated workers in state  and year  F i n a l l y ,c o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h em o d e lb e l o w ,w ec a l l = 
 + 
 the
total hours supplied by workers of both education levels (sum of  and )i ns t a t e and year ;  = 
 +

denotes the total employment (sum of natives and foreign born) in state  and year ;  =  /  measures
the average hours worked in the economy in state  in year ; and the variable  =  measures the
share of hours worked by the highly educated in state  and year 
We measure gross product at the state level  using data on GSP available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2008a). The Bureau of Economic Analysis produces ﬁgures on GSP in current dollars by combining
data on local labor income, local business taxes and local capital income by industry and state and complement-
ing these with value added data from the Economic Census. The currently available series covers the period
1963-2006. We use that series and convert it to constant 2000 dollars using the Implicit Price Deﬂators for
Gross Domestic Product available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2008b). Finally, we extend the series
backwards to 1960 using the state-speciﬁc real growth rates of GSP averaged over the 1963-1970 period in order
to impute growth between 1960 and 1963. We only use data relative to 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006
7Sixteen years of age is the cut-oﬀ chosen by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for those people who are deﬁned as "working age".
8Experience is calculated using the variable “AGE” and with the assumption that people without a high school degree enter the
labor force at age 17, people with a high school degree enter at 19, people with some college enter at 21 and people with a college
degree enter at 23.
7for the 50 states plus D.C. The variable , output per worker, is then constructed by dividing the real GSP
 by total employment in the state,  .
The construction of physical capital  is a bit more cumbersome. The National Economic Accounts only
estimates the stock of physical capital by industry at the national level9. Following Garofalo and Yamarik (2002)
we use the national estimates of the capital stock over the period 1963-2006 for 19 industries (listed in Appendix
C). We then distribute the national capital stock in a year for each industry across states in proportion to the
value added in that industry that is generated in each state. This assumes that industries operate at the same
capital-output (and capital-labor) ratios across states, hence deviation of the capital stock from its long-run
level for an industry is similar across states because capital mobility across states ensures equalization of capital
returns by industry. Essentially, the state composition across industries and the adjustment of the capital-labor
ratio at the industry level determine in our data the adjustment of state capital-labor ratios. We then deﬂate the
value of the capital stocks using the implicit capital stock price deﬂator available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2008b) and we extend the stock backward for each state to 1960, applying the average growth rate
between 1963-1970 to the period 1960-1962. This procedure gives us the panel of real capital stock values by
state . Capital per worker ( = ) is calculated by dividing the capital stock by total employment
in the state and year. Hence, in total, we can obtain direct measures of the variables    and
of the ratios   and 
3.2 Variables calculated indirectly
The variables  and  are not observed directly. However, we can use the production function expression
in (1) and the condition that the average hourly wage of more and less educated (
 and 
)e q u a l st h e
marginal productivity of  and , respectively, to obtain two equations in two unknowns and solve them. In
particular, setting the ratio of the hourly wages of  to  equal to the ratio of their marginal productivity










































Substituting (7) into (1) and solving explicitly for  we obtain:



































The only new variables required to calculate  and , besides those described in section 3.1 above, are
the hourly wages for more and less educated workers, 
 and 
 We obtain these from the IPUMS data by
averaging hourly wages (calculated from the same sample as the one used for hours worked) by state and year,
ﬁrst separately for individuals with some college education or more, 
 a n dt h e nf o rt h o s ew i t hh i g hs c h o o l
education or less, 

10 Finally, in order to implement (7) and (8) we need a value for the parameter ,t h e
elasticity of substitution in production between more and less educated workers. As there are several estimates
of this value in the literature, most of which cluster between 1.5 and 2.0 (see Ciccone and Peri 2006 for a recent
estimate and a summary of previous ones), we choose the median value of 175 for  and check the robustness
of our most relevant results to a value of 15 and of 20
3.3 Summary statistics and trends





  d  b  d 
  b  and b ) as well as those calculated indirectly ( b b )—are reported in Table A1 of the
Table Appendix. Some well known tendencies are evident in the data. The progressive increase in the inﬂow
of immigrants as a share of employment during the 70’s and again during the 90’s is noticeable. We also see
the slow-down in growth of income per worker and, correspondingly, of total factor productivity during the 70’s
(and 80’s) and the re-acceleration during the 2000-2006 period. Employment and working hours per person
experienced sustained growth over the entire 1970-2000 period with a reduction only in the 2000-2006 period.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 also illustrate the average and state-speciﬁc behavior of income per worker, capital
per worker and TFP, respectively, all in logarithmic terms. Besides conﬁrming the average tendencies of those
variables, the ﬁgures also show a moderate tendency of income per worker and TFP to converge across states (the
vertical spread between top and bottom states tends to contract over time) indicating continued technological
convergence over the period. Figure 4, capital per worker, shows less convergence than the other two and some
states with particularly large mining and oil sectors stand out as outliers. Finally, Figures 5 and 6 show that
both the skill-bias of technology,  and the share of highly educated workers,  increased constantly and
signiﬁcantly over the whole period and in particular during the 70’s and 80’s. The literature on wage dispersion
across education groups (e.g., Katz and Murphy 1992) has emphasized this ﬁnding, attributing it to directed
skill-biased technological change. Also, these two variables seem to exhibit a clear tendency towards cross-state
convergence over the period. Reassured by the behavior of our measured and constructed variables, which match
10The exact procedure used to calculate individual hourly wages is described in A.
9some important trends emphasized in the literature, we proceed to the empirical analysis.
4E s t i m a t e s o f t h e E ﬀects of Immigrants
4.1 OLS Estimates
Our main empirical strategy is to estimate equations like (5) using, alternatively, the growth rate of diﬀerent
variables in lieu of the placeholder b  T h ed e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e su s e di nt h er e g r e s s i o n sa r es h o w ni nt h eﬁrst
column of Tables 1 through 6, and the estimated elasticity () is reported in the cells of those tables. As
introductory results, Table 1 reports the OLS estimates of equation (5) on a panel of 50 U.S. states (plus
D.C.) using inter-census changes between 1960 and 2000 and the 2000-2006 change. Each cell reports the
result of a diﬀerent regression that includes time ﬁxed eﬀects, weights each cell by the total employment in
it, and reports the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state. The ﬁrst two rows of Table 1
decompose the eﬀect of immigration on total income into its eﬀect on total employment (d ) and on output
(gross state product) per worker (c ) The following four rows decompose the eﬀect on output per worker into






 , total factor productivity, b , average hours worked
b  and the skill-intensity index b .T h o s ef o u re ﬀects add up to the total eﬀect on c  Finally, the last two
rows show the eﬀect of immigration on the share of educated workers b  and on the skill-bias of productivity
b . Estimating the eﬀect via OLS and without any further controls11, but with common time eﬀects, leaves the
estimates subject to endogeneity and omitted variable issues. We propose an estimation strategy that addresses
those issues in the next sections.
In Table 1 we provide some evidence of stable and strong correlations between immigration and some of
the relevant growth rates, while including some simple controls and robustness checks. In particular, we check
whether the correlations depend on the period considered (in column 2 we drop the 60’s and in column 3 we
drop the 2000’s), and whether including the lagged dependent variable in order to capture autocorrelation over
time (column 4) or instrumenting employment changes due to immigrants with the population changes caused
by them (arguably a measure that is less aﬀected by labor market conditions) aﬀects the estimates.
The estimates are quite stable and robust across speciﬁcations so we can simply comment on the general
features of these correlations. First, the elasticity of total employment to immigrants is always larger than one
and never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. This conﬁrms the existing evidence (Card 2001, Card 2005, Cortes
2008, Ottaviano and Peri 2006) that there is no crowding-out of native employment by immigrants in local
labor markets12. The estimates are often larger than one, suggesting the existence of a demand-driven bias.
11Estimating the regressions for the components of   simultaneously in a seemigly unrelated least square regresion (SUR)
that accounts for correlation between the errors, produces almost identical elasicity estimates.
12Given the way we constructed our variables, a coeﬃcient of one on   implies that one immigrant worker produced an increase
in total employment of one, hence it produces no change in native employment.
10Second, there is a consistent positive and signiﬁcant correlation between income per worker and immigration.
This positive correlation results from the combination of a positive correlation of immigration with total factor
productivity, with an elasticity in the proximity of 1.25, and a negative correlation between immigration and
capital intensity, with an elasticity around -0.5. The positive eﬀect of immigrants on hours worked (+0.12/0.13)
and the negative eﬀect on the skill index b  (-0.15/-0.19) compensate for each other in terms of income per
worker.
Finally, we also ﬁnd a very signiﬁcant and robust negative correlation between the immigration rate in
employment and both the share of more educated workers as well as the skill-bias of technology, both with an
elasticity not far from -0.7. States with larger than average inﬂows of immigrants over the period 1960-2006 were
therefore associated with a one-for-one increase in employment, a larger growth of income per worker (entirely
due to larger TFP growth), while at the same time the capital and the skill intensity of production grew at a
slower rate. To look more closely at these eﬀects we begin addressing the endogeneity and omitted variable bias
of the OLS estimates using an instrumental variable technique.
4.2 Instruments and 2SLS
Our instrumental variable approach combines the instruments based on the past settlement of immigrants
(augmented by their national rate of growth) drawn from Card 2001, and then in several other studies (including
Card 2009 and Peri and Sparber 2009), with a purely geographical instrument based on the distance from the
main points of entry of immigrants into the US. Speciﬁcally, the imputed growth of immigrants as a share of the
working age population was calculated as follows. We ﬁrst identify from the Census foreign-born workers13 from
10 diﬀerent areas: Mexico, Rest of Latin America, Canada-Australia-New Zealand, Western Europe, Eastern
Europe and Russia, China, India, Rest of Asia, Africa and Others. Let us call these ten the "nationality of
origin" of the immigrants. For each nationality of origin  and each state  the total number of people in
working age (16-65) in Census 1960 is 1960 For each nationality of origin we also calculate the rate of
growth of the total working age population in the U.S., namely: 1960− =(  −  1960)1960.
This allows us to impute the immigrant population from each nationality of origin in each state, by applying
the national growth rate to the 1960 population from that nationality in each state. Hence the "imputed"
immigrant population from nationality  in state  would be d  =  1960 ∗ (1 + 1960−).A d d i n g
up across nationalities we have the total imputed population of immigrants in each state and year: d  =
P
 d  Finally, we construct the imputed decennial growth of working age population due to immigration
as
³
d +10 − d 
´
(d +  ) where  is the actual native population of working
age in state  and year . We use this measure as an instrument for the growth in employment due to immigrants
13U s i n gt h ev a r i a b l eB P L Df o r1 9 6 0a n dB P L Da n dC I T I Z E Nf o r1 9 7 0a n dl a t e r .




The US-Mexico border (for Mexican immigrants) and Los Angeles and New York (for other travelers) are the
main points of entry to the U.S. The distance of each state’s center of gravity from the Border, New York and
Los Angeles is calculated as follows. First, we obtain data on the geodesic coordinates of each state’s population
center of gravity from the 2000 Census as well as for 12 sections of the U.S.- Mexican border, covering its entire
length, and for New York, Los Angeles and Miami. We then use the formula for geodesic distance to calculate
the distance (in thousands of kilometers) between each state’s center of gravity and the relevant points of entry.
We then interact the logarithmic distance variables with ﬁve decade dummies (60’s, 70’s, 80’s, 90’s and 00-06).
This captures the fact that distance from the border had a larger eﬀect in predicting the inﬂow of immigrants in
decades with larger Mexican immigra t i o na n dt h ed i s t a n c ef r o mL o sA n g e les had a larger impact on immigrant
inﬂows in periods of large immigration from China and Asia.
The imputed immigrants and geographic instruments have strong power. Their F-test in the samples used
vary between 36 and 44 when used jointly (see the second to last row in Table 2). Even the geographic
instruments by themselves have signiﬁcant power (F-test of 25, as reported in the last column of Table 2).
Moreover, the instruments, when used jointly, pass the test of overidentifying restrictions and one cannot reject
the assumption of exogeneity of instruments at 5% conﬁdence level14. Surveying the results across speciﬁcations,
again using diﬀerent samples (omitting 1960 in speciﬁcation 2 and 2006 in speciﬁcation 3), controlling for past
lagged values (speciﬁcation 4), and using only the geographic instruments (speciﬁcation 5) we obtain a very
consistent picture. First, the impact on total employment is now estimated to be close to one and never
statistically diﬀerent from one. The diﬀerence between the OLS and the 2SLS estimates conﬁrms the idea
that some reverse causality may bias the OLS estimates up. Similarly, the eﬀect on the growth of income per
worker is lower than in the OLS case and between 0.4 and 0.5, still statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
Decomposing this eﬀect one sees that the positive elasticity results from the combination of a positive eﬀect on
TFP with a negative eﬀect of around -0.5 on capital intensity.
I nt h ee s t i m a t e si nT a b l e2t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of immigration on the skill index b  is not fully balanced
by the positive eﬀect on hours worked and so those two terms contribute negatively to output per worker.
T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects of immigration on the share of highly educated workers and on the skill-bias of technology
are strongly conﬁrmed by the 2SLS estimates and in both cases the elasticity is around -1. Interpreting the
coeﬃcient as causal, which would be the case if the instruments are uncorrelated with any economic factor
aﬀecting productivity and growth in a state-decade, the analysis reveals three eﬀects of immigration not clearly
measured before and conﬁrms two well-known eﬀects. First, immigration mechanically increases employment
14The test statistic, under the null hypothesis that none of the instruments appear in the second stage regression, is distributed
as a Chi-square with degrees of freedom given by the diﬀerence between the number of instruments and the endogenous variables
(15 in our case). The test statistics equals 7.65. The corresponding value for the relevant Chi-square distribution, with 15 degrees
of freedom, is 0.07, and hence the null hypothesis level stands at 5% conﬁd e n c e .S e eW o l r d i g e( 2 0 0 2 )f o rt h ed e t a i l so ft h et e s t .
12and reduces its share of highly educated workers, and it does not crowd out native employment. These are well-
known eﬀects already emphasized by Card (2007) and Card and Lewis (2007). Second, immigration promotes
production techniques that are less capital intensive and more unskilled-intensive (both eﬀects were suggested
by Lewis 2005 and are consistent with the idea of directed technological choice) but it also increases overall
factor-neutral productivity.
The most remarkable and new estimated eﬀects are those regarding total factor productivity and its skill
bias. The ﬁrst is responsible for the signiﬁcant net positive eﬀect of immigrants on output per worker and the
second is a direct test of directed technical adoption. Hence, we will devote section 4.4 to testing their robustness
to the inclusion of several controls. Before doing that, however, let us also analyze the impact of immigrants
on capital intensity. Capital intensity, measured as the capital-output ratio, may decrease either because the
capital stock does not respond to immigration, because it responds less than employment, or because, in spite
of a full response to employment, the capital-labor ratio does not increase as TFP increases. We decompose the
decrease in the next section in order to isolate these three eﬀects and we ﬁnd that the decrease in capital-output
is due to an increase in TFP vis-a-vis a constant capital-labor ratio.
4.3 A closer look at physical capital
Table 3 analyzes the response of the growth rate of the capital stock, b  of the capital-labor ratio, b  − b 






 to immigration as a share of employment. We report
the OLS estimates (speciﬁcations 1 to 3) and 2SLS estimates (speciﬁcations 4 to 6) using all instruments. We
allow for samples that omit the initial decade (speciﬁcations 2 and 4) or the last one (speciﬁcations 3 and 6).
In all the regressions we include the capital-labor ratio of the state at the beginning of the decade to control for
the potential tendency of capital intensity to convergence across states, and we report heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered by state. The estimates, especially those using 2SLS, show that within the decade
immigration produced a one-for-one response of capital so that the capital-labor ratio in states receiving more
immigrants did not decline at all as a result. The inﬂow of immigrants stimulated a corresponding increase in
investment that left the capital-labor ratio basically unchanged. However, because of the productivity increase,
output is growing faster than employment and, when measured in terms of the capital-output ratio, the economy
is adopting technologies that appear less capital intensive. The reduction in capital intensity is not due to
incomplete adjustment of capital to labor but to the disproportionate increase in output. Rather than being
the result of a slow adjustment of the capital stock this phenomenon seems more likely due to a change in
the capital intensity of the production techniques adopted, possibly associated with the chosen technology or
productive organization. The corresponding reduction in the skill-intensity of the productivity (the eﬀect on )
may be associated with this phenomenon. The model in Krusell et al. (2001) in which skill-biased technologies
13are explicitly linked to the intensity of equipment/capital in production may provide a joint explanation for
the two phenomena: immigrants stimulate the choice of techniques toward those that more eﬃciently use less
educated workers and are less capital intensive.
4.4 The Eﬀects on Productivity and Skill-Bias
The most remarkable and novel eﬀects estimated in Table 2 are the positive, large and signiﬁcant eﬀect of
immigration on total factor productivity ( b ) and the negative, large and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the skill-bias of
technology (b ).B o t h e ﬀects are quite large and while they are not estimated extremely precisely they are
always very signiﬁcant. The concern is that the geographic instruments used in the 2SLS estimation, while
certainly aﬀecting the immigration rates and certainly exogenous with respect to technological changes, may
be correlated with other features that have aﬀected productivity growth and its skill-intensity. The geographic
location of a state, for instance, may be correlated for climatic reasons with its amenities, or also with its sector
composition (think of agriculture and mining) which may aﬀect its access to international and national markets
and therefore the location of highly educated workers along with the adoption and diﬀusion of technologies.
For these reasons we include in the regression several variables that are aimed at capturing the independent
inﬂuence of these factors on the productivity and technology of U.S. states. We include each of them, one by
one, considering them as potentially endogenous and therefore using the geographic and imputed-immigrant
instruments to predict them. While the instruments are not very powerful in predicting the controls, what
we care about is that they maintain power in predicting immigration rates and that the estimated eﬀect of
immigration remains signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcient on the control variables is often estimated imprecisely (and we do not report them in Tables 4
and 5); however, what we care about is the coeﬃcient on the immigration rate, estimated using the instruments.
The inclusion of the controls implies that we are using the variation in the geography-based instruments that is
orthogonal to the controlled factor (and hence independent from it) to predict the immigration rate and its eﬀect
on productivity. We include the controls one at the time, since including them all together reduces the power of
the instrument so drastically that we obtain very large standard errors. Table 4 shows the estimated coeﬃcients
on the immigration rates in regressions based on (5), using b  as the dependent variable. Table 5 shows the
coeﬃcients of a similar regression with b  as the dependent variable. Proceeding from top to bottom, Tables
4 and 5 show estimates obtained using OLS estimation methods (ﬁrst row) or 2SLS estimation methods (rows
2 to 4). Moreover, to check how robust the results are to the choice of the parameter  (the substitutability
between more and less educated workers) in the construction of b  and b  we report the estimates using two
alternative values of that parameter (equal to 1.5 and 2, respectively). The last two rows of Tables 4 and 5
report results from a speciﬁcation that we will discuss in section 4.5.
14Considering the diﬀerent speciﬁcations (columns) in Table 4 (which correspond to those in Table 5), we ﬁrst
report the basic estimates obtained from a regression that only controls for time ﬁxed eﬀects, then column (2)
controls for the average real yearly R&D spending per worker in each state in the 70’s, 80’s and 90’s. The data
are from the National Science Foundation (1998) and include total (private and federal) funds for industrial
R&D in constant 1990 US dollars15. We obtain the variable by dividing the aggregate state data by state
employment. The estimated eﬀect of the R&D variable on TFP changes (not reported and corresponding to
the speciﬁcation in the basic 2SLS in the second row) is 0.10 (with a standard error equal to 0.09) while its
eﬀect on b  is 0.04 (with standard error 0.10). So the R&D variable positively aﬀects both productivity and
skill-bias, which is expected. Due to the low power of the instruments in predicting it, however, the estimated
standard errors are large and the estimates are not signiﬁcant. More importantly for our purposes, the inclusion
of R&D as a control (and the shortening of the sample to 1970-2000) does not aﬀect much the estimated eﬀect
of immigration on TFP (with an elasticity of 1.15 in the basic speciﬁcation) and on the skill-bias (an elasticity
of -0.94).
The second column of Tables 4 and 5 introduces computer use as a control. The adoption of computer
technology is a major technological innovation leading to increased productivity, especially of the highly edu-
cated, and since its diﬀusion varied by sector and location we can control for it. To do this, we introduce the
share of workers in each state that use a computer at work to the regression. The original (individual) data are
from the March supplement of the Current Population Survey, and are available for the years 1984, 1997, 2001.
Assuming that in 1970 no worker used a computer, since the PC was ﬁrst introduced in 1980, we interpolate
linearly the 3 data points and we impute the shares in 1980, 1990 and 2000 for each state. We include this
control in speciﬁcation (3). The estimated coeﬃcient of the computer adoption variable on b  (not reported)
is 2.10 (standard error 0.90) while on b  it is 0.21 (standard error 0.16)16. As expected, computer adoption
has a positive and skill-biased eﬀect on productivity across states. More interesting for us, however, is that the
eﬀect of immigration on b  is still large and signiﬁcant (but reduced by 30% to an elasticity of 0.72) and the
eﬀect on the skill-bias is essentially unchanged in its magnitude (0.90) and signiﬁcance (standard error equal to
0.13). While the adoption of computers may involve the reorganization of production in a way that is similar
to the task specialization that occurs between natives and immigrants (see the next section), the productivity
gains from geography-driven migration ﬂows are robust to the inclusion of the computer adoption variable.
The third control, introduced in speciﬁcation (4), is also a very important one. The geographic location of
an economy is a very important determinant of its trade with the rest of the world. Being close to a major port,
to the coast, to navigable rivers and the distance from other countries all aﬀect trade costs and hence trade
15The data are available every year for the period 1975-1998. We calculate the average yearly expenditure in a state between
1975 and 1979 and we impute it over the whole 70’s decade and the average over 1991-1998 is used for the 90’s decade.
16In both cases we report the coeﬃcients from the basic 2SLS speciﬁcation in the second row.
15volumes. Moreover, during the decades between 1960 and 2009 the U.S. signiﬁcantly increased its trade with
the rest of the world. Since trade may increase productivity (promoting competition, inducing specialization,
reducing costs of inputs) we control for trade as a share of GSP in order to account for this eﬀect. The data on
exports of manufactured goods by state of origin are from the Origin of Movement data available from the US
Census and for purchase on CD-ROM (at www.gtis.com). These data are the total value, in current dollars, of
exports from each state from 1987 to 2006. We calculate exports as a share of GSP in 1987-1989 and attribute
this value to the entire decade of the 1980’s and then calculate the average export/GSP value by state in the
1990’s and in the 2000-2006 period. We include these values in the regression as a proxy for the access of a
state to international trade in each decade. The downside is that we have to limit our analysis to the 80’s,
90’s and 2000-2006. The coeﬃcient obtained for the eﬀect of trade on productivity is negative (-0.36) and
signiﬁcant (standard error 0.13) while the eﬀect on the skill-bias is not signiﬁcant. While such a negative eﬀect
is somewhat surprising, it is worth noting that if we only include trade as an explanatory variable in the TFP
regression (instrumented with the geographic variables) its eﬀect is estimated to be positive (+0.30), although
not signiﬁcant (standard error 0.70). When included as a control (as in column 4) its eﬀect become negative,
while immigration maintains a positive and very signiﬁcant, in fact enhanced (+1.51), eﬀect on productivity
(Table 4), with an unchanged eﬀect on the productivity bias (-1.04). These results imply that the geographic
openness of a state seems to have aﬀected productivity positively, but the eﬀect worked through immigration
and not trade. This is an interesting ﬁnding, as the many papers studying the eﬀect of trade on growth across
countries (e.g., Frankel and Romer 2003) do not control for migration ﬂows.
Finally, the last column of Tables 4 and 5 introduces a control that accounts for the wage growth in each state,
according to its sector-composition. In particular, we construct a proxy for sector-driven productivity growth
by averaging the growth rate of the average wage in each of 13 sectors (deﬁned as the 2-digit deﬁnition of the
variable IND1990 in the IPUMS), each weighted by the initial (1960) share of that sector in state employment.
This control accounts for the fact that diﬀerent states had diﬀerent sector structures in 1960 and this might be
correlated with geography and it aﬀect on productivity growth. The inclusion of this variable (whose coeﬃcient
on TFP is positive and very signiﬁcant) does not modify much the eﬀect of immigration on b  and on b 
In summary, the (unskilled-biased) productivity eﬀect of immigrants is quite robust to the inclusion of several
controls. This, together with the null eﬀect on native employment, implies that across the analyzed time-horizon
(ten year changes) immigration had a positive eﬀect on the total wages of natives.
4.5 The Eﬃcient Task-Specialization Hypothesis
There are two mechanisms proposed and studied in the previous literature that can jointly explain the positive
productivity eﬀect of immigrants and its skill-bias. Lewis and Card (2007) ﬁnd that in markets with an
16increase in less educated immigrants a large proportion of all sectors show a higher intensity of unskilled
workers. Furthermore, Lewis (2005) documents that in those labor markets there is a slower adoption of
skill-intensive techniques. Combining these ﬁndings with the theory of "directed technological change" or
"appropriate technological adoption" (Acemoglu 2002) one can infer that the availability of unskilled workers
pushes ﬁrms to adopt technologies that are more eﬃcient and intensive in the use of unskilled workers. More
recently, in a paper with Chad Sparber (Peri and Sparber 2009) we show that in states with large inﬂows
of immigrants, natives with lower education tend to specialize in more communication-intensive production
tasks, leaving to immigrants more manual-intensive tasks. This produces increased task-specialization following
comparative advantages and results in eﬃciency gains, especially among less educated workers. In the last two
rows of Table 4 we analyze whether the reorganization of production around the eﬃcient specialization of natives
(and immigrants) can explain part of the measured productivity gains.
We include in the regression a measure of the change in relative specialization of less educated natives
between communication and manual tasks at the state level. The variable is constructed (as described in Peri
and Sparber 2009) by attributing the intensity of physical-manual tasks () and of communication-interactive
() tasks to each worker,  based on their occupation, using the average of 52 ability variables collected in the
O*NET dataset. Then we calculate the average of the ratio of these two task intensities for native workers in each
state  and year   The percentage change in this variable is then included in the regression. The idea
is that if immigrants aﬀect the eﬃciency of production in a state, by reallocating natives toward communication
tasks and by undertaking manual tasks, leading to an overall productivity improvement, we should observe the
productivity eﬀect of immigrants mostly through the task-reallocation of natives. Hence, controlling for this
task reallocation the productivity impact of immigrants should decrease. Moreover, the instruments used to
predict immigrant ﬂows should also be good instruments for the endogenous task reallocation. This is exactly
what we observe in the last two rows of Figure 4, where we report the coeﬃcients on the immigration variable
and on the specialization change, estimated by 2SLS and also including (in speciﬁcations 2 to 5) the other
controls.
Two important patterns emerge. First, the estimated coeﬃcient on the change in specialization is positive
and mostly signiﬁcant—in other words, the specialization change instrumented by geography has a positive eﬀect
on productivity. Second, the coeﬃcient on the immigration variable, while still positive, is reduced signiﬁcantly,
often to half of its original estimate (without a control for specialization). It also loses its signiﬁcance in
three cases. Hence, the eﬀect of controlling for the "change in specialization" on the estimated coeﬃcient of
immigration on TFP is much more drastic than the eﬀect of introducing any other control. This is a sign that
a large part of the positive productivity eﬀect may actually go through the eﬃcient re-allocation of natives and
immigrants across production tasks. The eﬀect of controlling for task re-allocation in the skill-bias regression is
17much smaller. This is expected, as reallocation is likely to enhance overall eﬃciency. However, even controlling
for task re-allocation, states with a large inﬂow of immigrants are likely to choose relatively unskilled-intensive
techniques.
4.6 Robustness of the main estimated eﬀects
The overall picture emerging from the empirical analysis is clear. Conﬁrming the results of several articles on
the labor market eﬀect of immigrants we ﬁnd that they have a one-for-one impact on total employment, with no
evidence of crowding out of natives. More interestingly, we ﬁnd that immigrants had a signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect
on the total factor productivity of states, with a signiﬁcant pro-unskilled bias. The productivity eﬀect (combined
with other smaller eﬀects on capital intensity, skills and hours worked) drives a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of immigration on GSP per worker. In this section we check whether these eﬀects (on d  b  b  and b )
are all robust to further controls and sample restrictions. Table 6 presents the estimates of the elasticity of the
variables to immigrants when estimated in 2SLS, allowing for diﬀerent robustness checks. First, especially for
GSP and productivity, one may suspect that convergence across states may bias the estimates if immigrants
tend to ﬂow into states that are catching-up. Including the initial value of the dependent variable to account
for convergence (column 2 of Table 6) does not change any qualitative result; in fact, it increases the estimated
positive impact of immigration on employment, GSP per worker and productivity.
If we eliminate the border states (with Mexico) in speciﬁcation (3) the explanatory power of the instruments
is reduced, which is evident in the larger standard errors. However, while the employment eﬀect is estimated to
be much smaller, though very imprecise, all the other eﬀects (notably on TFP and GSP per worker) are positive,
larger than in the basic sample, and still very signiﬁcant. The standard errors and estimates also increase when
we eliminate the largest state economies (California, Texas and New York), which are also the largest receivers
of immigrants. Overall, while a large part of the variation in the instrument is between border or coastal states
and the rest, so that dropping them reduces the precision, the positive elasticity of productivity and GSP per
worker to immigrants may be even larger in non-coastal, non-border states. This suggests that possibly the
larger eﬃciency gains per immigrant from specialization are realized when immigrants are a small group and
access highly manual-intensive occupations in services, construction, agriculture and manufacturing. As they
become a larger fraction of the labor force they access occupations where they do not have such a large relative
advantage and the overall eﬃciency gain per immigrant decreases. Finally, restricting the sample to only the
three most recent decades, which experienced by far the largest aggregate inﬂow of immigrants, and including 4
regional dummies (West, South, Midwest and East) does not change the estimates much. Even when estimated
within regions the inﬂow of immigrants is found to have had a signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect on productivity and
GSP per worker.
184.7 Eﬀects on wages
To make a ﬁnal check of the consistency of our results with those found in the labor literature (which mostly
analyzes the wage impact of immigrants), from our estimates we can obtain the impact of immigration on the
wages of more and less educated workers. If we deﬁne the hourly wages of more and less skilled workers as the
marginal productivity of  and  and then manipulate the expression, collect common terms and calculate
the rates of change, we obtain the following two decompositions that help us attribute the percentage change









































The ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side of (9) and (10) are common to both formulas and imply that
increases in the capital-labor ratio and in the total factor productivity of the economy increase the marginal
productivity of all workers and increase the hourly salaries of both types of workers. In contrast, the remaining
terms show that an increase in the share of highly educated workers c  or in their relative productivity c  has
diﬀerential eﬀects on more and less skilled workers. The hourly wages of highly educated workers beneﬁtf r o m
a decrease in the share  a n df r o ma ni n c r e a s ei n, while the hourly wages of less educated workers beneﬁt
from an increase in  and from a decrease in  Using the estimates from Table 2, Column 1, the eﬀect of
an inﬂow of immigrants equal to 0.50% of initial employment (which was roughly the yearly inﬂow during the
period 1990-2006) on the wages of more educated workers is equal to +0.36%17. On the other hand, still using
the estimates from Table 2, Column 1 and the formula in (10), and using as initial values of  and  their
values in 1990, we obtain the result that the same increase in immigrants (equal to 0.50% of current employment)
produces a 0.04% increase in the wages of less educated workers18. These values are in line with most of the
literature on the labor market eﬀects of immigrants that ﬁnds a somewhat positive eﬀect of immigration on the
highly skilled (e.g., Card 2009, Ottaviano and Peri 2008) and an eﬀect close to zero on the wages of the less
skilled (Card 2001, 2009). Our decomposition emphasizes that the supply eﬀect of immigrants on less educated
workers is balanced by the unskilled-biased productivity eﬀect, so that the result is a very small wage eﬀect on
less educated workers. On the other hand, the TFP and supply eﬀects are large enough for highly educated
workers so that, in spite of the unskilled-biased impact of immigrants, the overall eﬀect of immigration on their
wages is positive.
17The calculations involve simply substituting the terms from Table 2 into (9) as follows:
106 − 047 + (1175) ∗ (−021 + 108) − (075175) ∗ 085 and then multiplying by 0.5.
18These calculations simply involve substituting the terms from Table 2 into 10:
106 − 047 + (1175) ∗ (−021 − (122) ∗ (108)) + 043 ∗ 085 ∗ 1 and then multiplying by 0.5.
195C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper uses an aggregate accounting approach to estimate the eﬀect of immigration on productivity, capital
intensity and the skill-bias of US state economies. We consider the variation in immigrant location due to
geography (as an instrument) in order to isolate the causal eﬀect of immigration on these variables. We also
control for several other determinants of productivity that vary across states and are possibly related to their
location. We present three main ﬁndings, two of which are quite new in this literature. First, we conﬁrm that
immigrants do not crowd-out employment of (or hours worked by) natives but simply add to total employment.
Second, we ﬁnd that they increase total factor productivity signiﬁcantly and, third, that such eﬃciency gains are
unskilled-biased—larger, that is, for less educated workers. We check that these eﬀects are robust to including
several control variables (such as R&D spending, technological adoption, sector composition or openness to
international trade) and that they are not explained by productivity convergence across states or driven only
by a few states or particular decades. We conjecturet h a ta tl e a s tp a r to ft h ep o s i t i v ep r o d u c t i v i t ye ﬀects are
due to an eﬃcient specialization of immigrants and natives in manual-intensive and communication-intensive
tasks, respectively (in which each group has a comparative advantage), resulting in an overall eﬃciency gain.
Preliminary empirical evidence supports this claim. In conclusion, we also check that these ﬁndings are in line
with the analysis of the wage eﬀect of immigrants on less educated natives, which is close to 0, and on highly
educated natives, which is positive.
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22A Appendix: Census Data
A.1 Deﬁnition of the Samples
1) Eliminate people living in group quarters (military or convicts): those with the gq variable equal to 0, 3
or 4.
2) Eliminate people younger than 17. Since people of working age are deﬁned by BLS as those 16 an
older, and since the questions related to work variables pertain to the previous year, we consider 17 years of age
as the cut-oﬀ.
3) Eliminate those who worked 0 weeks last year, which corresponds to wkswork2=0 in 1960 and 1970
and wkswork1=0 in 1980-1990-2000 and ACS.
4) Once we calculate experience as age-(time ﬁrst worked), where (time ﬁrst worked) is 16 for workers
with no HS degree, 19 for HS graduates, 21 for workers with some college education and 23 for college graduates,
we eliminate all those with experience 1a n d40.
5) Eliminate those workers who do not report valid salary income (999999) or report 0.
6) Eliminate the self-employed (keeping those for whom the variable CLASSWKD is between 20 and 28).
Construction of hours worked and employment by cell
To calculate the total amount of hours worked by natives and immigrants, male and female, in each education-
experience cell, we add the hours worked by each person multiplied by her personal weight (PERWT) in the
cell.
Construction of the average hourly wage by cell
In each cell we average the hourly wage of individuals, each weighted by the hours worked by the individ-
ual. Hence individuals with few hours worked (low job attachment) are correspondingly weighted little in the
calculation of the average wage of the group.
A.2 Individual Variables: Deﬁnition and Description
Education: Education groups in each year are deﬁned using the variable EDUCREC which was built in order
to consistently reﬂect the variables HIGRADE and EDUC99. In particular, we deﬁne as less educated ()
those with EDUCREC=7, corresponding to a high school degree or less. Highly educated are those with
EDUCREC=8, corresponding to some college or more.
Experience: Deﬁned as potential experience, assigns to each schooling group a certain age reﬂecting the
beginning of their working life; in particular, the initial working ages are: 17 years for workers with no degree,
19 years for high school graduates, 21 years for those with some college education and 23 years for college
graduates.
23Immigration Status: In each year, only people who are not citizens or who were naturalized citizens are
counted as immigrants. This is done using the variable CITIZEN and by attributing the status of foreign-born
to people when the variable is equal to 2 or 3. In 1960, the variable is not available and the selection is done
using the variable BPLD (birthplace, detailed) and by attributing the status of foreign-born to all of those for
which BPLD15000, except for the codes 90011 and 90021 which indicate U.S. citizens born abroad.
W e e k sW o r k e di naY e a r :For the censuses 1960 and 1970 the variable used to deﬁne weeks worked in
the last year is WKSWORK2, which deﬁnes weeks worked in intervals. We choose the median value for each
interval so that we impute to individuals weeks worked in the previous year according to the following criteria:
6.5 weeks if wkswork2=1; 20 weeks if wkswork2=2; 33 weeks if wkswork2=3; 43.5 weeks if wkswork2=4; 48.5
weeks if wkswork2=5; 51 weeks if wkswork2==6. For the censuses 1980, 1990, 2000 and ACS we use the variable
wkswork1 which records the exact number of weeks worked last year.
Hours Worked in a Week: For census years 1960 and 1970 the variable used is HRSWORK2 which
measures the hours worked during the last week, using intervals. We attribute to each interval its median value
and measure the number of hours per week worked by an individual according to the following criteria: 7.5
hours if hrswork2=1; 22 hours if hrswork2=2; 32 hours if hrswork2=3; 37 hours if hrswork2=4; 40 hours if
hrswork2=5; 44.5 hours if hrswork2=6; 54 hours if hrswork2=7; 70 hours if hrswork2==8. For the censuses
1980, 1990, 2000 and ACS we use the variable UHRSWORK which records the exact number of hours worked
i nau s u a lw e e kb yap e r s o n .
H o u r sW o r k e di naY e a r :This is the measure of labor supply by an individual and it is obtained by
multiplying Hours Worked in a Week by Weeks Worked in a Year, as deﬁned above.
Yearly Wages: The yearly wage in constant 1999 US dollars is calculated as the variable INCWAGE
multiplied by the price deﬂator suggested in the IPUMS, which is the one below. Recall that each census and
ACS is relative to the previous year so the deﬂators below are those to be applied to years 1960, 1970, 1980,
and so on:
   1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2005
 5725 4540 2314 1344 1000 0853
Topcodes for Yearly Wages: Following an established procedure we multiply the topcodes for yearly
wages in 1960, 1970 and 1980 by 1.5.
Hourly Wages: The hourly wage for an individual is constructed by dividing the yearly wage as deﬁned
above by the number of weeks worked in a year times the number of hours worked in a week.
24B Appendix: Construction of Physical Capital by State
In our construction of the state capital stocks we follow Garofalo and Yamarik (2002). This involved distributing
the national capital stock by industry and year, obtained from the BEA (2008b), to each state and industry
and year according to the percentage of value added for the state and industry and year in the national value
added for that industry and year, obtained from the BEA (2008a). In other words, following the notation of







We then summed over all industries , for each state ,i ny e a r, to obtain a capital stock series by state and
year. Finally, we used as a price deﬂator the implicit capital deﬂator, obtained from the aggregate BEA data to
transform the capital stock series into real values. Furthermore, the value added data at the state level needed to
be generated for all years using a concordance, as described below. That concordance left us with 19 industries
that we use to attribute the capital stock. The industries are: Agriculture; Forestry; Fishing and Hunting; Min-
ing; Utilities; Construction; Manufacturing; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Transportation and Warehousing;
Information, Finance and Insurance; Real Estate and Rental and Leasing; Professional, Scientiﬁc, and Technical
Services; Management of Companies and Enterprises; Administrative and Waste Management Services; Educa-
tional Services; Health Care and Social Assistance; Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation; Accommodation and
Food Services; Other Services, except Government.
Constructing the NAICS97 to SIC87 Concordance
The ﬁrst step in generating the capital stock by state was to generate a crosswalk, or concordance, from
NAICS97 to SIC87 using the Census Bureau’s crosswalks at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97brdg/index.html.
This step was necessary in order to extend the BEA’s value added by state data to pre-1997 dates. The bridge
from NAICS97 to SIC87 (NtoS) lists a NAICS code and then the corresponding SIC codes that go into it, and
then the establishments, sales, payroll and employees per that combination. The ﬁle does not, however, list the
percentage of the SIC category which should be attributed to the NAICS code, and since there may be more
than one NAICS code per SIC code, this information is needed. The HTML version on the website does list
this percentage, but it is unfortunately not in the electronic ﬁle. This percentage can be calculated using the
opposite bridge from SIC87 to NAICS97 (StoN). The StoN ﬁle contains the same variables as the NtoS ﬁle, but
maps all the NAICS that go into a given SIC. Also available are the totals of the 4 categories (sales, etc.) for
each SIC code, at diﬀerent digit levels (2-digit, 3-digit, etc.).
We delete everything in the StoN ﬁle except the SIC totals (we delete the SIC to NAICS mappings). We
then merge these to the NtoS ﬁl eb yS I Cc o d e ,s ot h a tn o wt h eN t o Sﬁle has the mapping as before, but also
25includes the totals for each SIC value next to each NAICS-sic pair. Then the percentage can be calculated for
each NAICS-sic combination by dividing the NAICS-SIC totals into the merged SIC totals. Since what we
actually want is SIC2 to NAICS2, and the original mapping (NtoS) is actually SIC4 to NAICS6, before merging
the SIC4 totals into the NtoS ﬁl ew et r i m m e dt h eN A I C Sc o d e sd o w nt o2d i g i t s ,a n dt h e ns u m m e du po v e rt h e
unique SIC4-NAICS2 combinations. We then trimmed the SIC4 values to SIC2, and summed over the unique
SIC2-NAICS2 values. Finally, we merged in the SIC2 totals from the StoN ﬁle and calculated the percentage
of each SIC2 that goes into each NAICS2.
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: 





























Note: Each cell is the result of a separate regression. The explanatory variable is the net inflow of immigrant workers over an inter-census period as a percentage of 
the initial employment. The units of observations are US states (plus DC) in each census year 1960-2000 plus 2006. Each regression includes time fixed effects. The 
method of estimation is least squares with observations weighted by the employment of the state. Errors in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by 
state. **=significant at the 5% confidence level. The calculated variables use the assumption that σ=1.75. 
Explanatory variable is 
immigration as percentage 
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Table 2: 
2SLS estimates of the impact of immigration on the components of Gross State Product growth 






























Note: Each cell is the result of a separate regression. The explanatory variable is the net inflow of immigrant workers over an inter-census period as a percentage of 
the initial employment. The units of observations are US states (plus DC) in each census year 1960-2000 plus 2006. The method of estimation is 2SLS with imputed 
immigrants and distance from border and from port of entry interacted with decade dummies as instruments. The errors in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust 
and clustered by state. The calculated variables use the assumption that σ=1.75. 
Explanatory variable is 
immigration as percentage 
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First stage F-test  36.71  36.52 38.73 44.22  25.03 









Note: Each cell is the result of a separate regression. The explanatory variable is the net inflow of immigrant workers over an inter-census period as a percentage of 
the initial employment. The units of observations are US states (plus DC) in each census year 1960-2000 plus 2006. The method of estimation is OLS in column 1 to 
3 and 2SLS with imputed immigrants and distance from border interacted with decade dummies as instruments. Each regression includes time dummies as well as 
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 Table  4:   

























Note: Each cell in row 1 to 4 is the coefficient of the regression of  A ˆ on the change in employment due to immigrants, estimated including time fixed 
effects. The baseline estimate (row 1) is OLS with TFP constructed using the assumption that σ=1.75.In the second row we use 2SLS with imputed 
immigrants and border distance plus distance from New York and Los Angeles, interacted with decade dummies. In the third and fourth row the method 
of estimation is 2SLS and total factor productivity is constructed under the assumption that σ, the elasticity of substitution between more and less 
educated is 1.5 or 2. In the last two rows we report the coefficient of a regression of A simultaneously on the immigration rate and on the change in task-
specialization of natives. The units of observations are 50 US states plus DC in each census year between 1960 and 2000 plus 2006. The errors in 
parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
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Task specialization channel: dependent variable A 
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Table 5: 
























Note: Each cell in row 1 to 4 is the coefficient of the regression of  βˆ on the change in employment due to immigrants, estimated including time fixed 
effects. The baseline estimate (row 1) is OLS with TFP constructed using the assumption that σ=1.75.In the second row we use 2SLS with imputed 
immigrants and border distance plus distance from New York and Los Angeles, interacted with decade dummies. In the third and fourth row the method 
of estimation is 2SLS and total factor productivity is constructed under the assumption that σ, the elasticity of substitution between more and less 
educated is 1.5 or 2. In the last two rows we report the coefficient of a regression of A simultaneously on the immigration rate and on the change in task-
specialization of natives. The units of observations are 50 US states plus DC in each census year between 1960 and 2000 plus 2006. The errors in 
parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
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Explanatory variables:  Task specialization channel: dependent variable β ˆ  
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Table 6: 








Note: Each cell is the result of a separate regression. The explanatory variable is the net inflow of immigrant workers over an inter-census period as a percentage of 
the initial employment. The units of observations are US states (plus DC) in each census year 1960-2000 plus 2006. The method of estimation is2SLS with imputed 
immigrants and distance from border interacted with decade dummies as instruments. Each regression includes decade dummies. The Errors in parenthesis are 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Real GSP per worker in logarithmic scale 
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Figure 3 
Real capital per worker in logarithmic scale 
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Total Factor Productivity (A) in logarithmic scale 
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Share of workers with some college education or more, h 
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Annual Growth Rate of: 
60’s 70’s  80’s  90’s  2000-2006 
Foreign Employment (as 
percentage of total)  
0.1%   0.3%  0.25%  0.5%  0.5% 
Total Employment (N ˆ ) 
2.5% 3.2%  2.1%  2.5%  1% 
Gross Product per Worker ( y ˆ )  1.9% 1.8%  1.3%  0.9%  1.8% 
Capital-Output ratio  ) ˆ ˆ ( Y K −   -0.3% -0.3%  -1%  -0.9%  +0.4% 
Total Factor Productivity  A ˆ  
2.0% 0.6%  1.6%  1.4%  2.0% 
Hours per Worker x ˆ  
-0.02% 1.2% 0.4% 0.3%  -0.04% 
Share of Highly Educated  h ˆ
 
2.1% 3.0%  2.8%  0.9%  0.02% 
Skill-bias of Technology β ˆ
 
2.9% 2.6%  3.4%  0.9%  0.4% 